What's the point of knowing how?

Why is it useful to talk and think about knowledge‐how? Using Edward Craig's discussion of the function of the concepts of knowledge as a jumping off point, this paper argues that considering this question can offer us new angles on the debate about knowledge‐how. We consider two candidate functions...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:European Journal of Philosophy Vol. 27; no. 3; pp. 693 - 709
Autor principal: Habgood‐Coote, Joshua
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Sep2019
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=139703743&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: hlh
    uiTerm: 139703743
    longDbName: Humanities International Complete
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        09668373
        7PU
      jtl: European Journal of Philosophy
      issn: 09668373
      maglogo: Y
    pubinfo:
      dt: Sep2019
      vid: 27
      iid: 3
      pid: 480
      pub: Wiley-Blackwell
    artinfo:
      ui:
        139703743
        10.1111/ejop.12431
      ppf: 693
      ppct: 16
      formats:
        fmt:
          – @attributes:
              type: T
          – @attributes:
              type: P
              size: 478KB
      tig:
        atl: What's the point of knowing how?
      aug:
        au: Habgood‐Coote, Joshua
        affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, Bristol UK
      su:
        Language awareness
        Theory of knowledge
        Philosophical theology
        Ethics
        Craig, Edward
      sug:
        subj:
          Language awareness
          Theory of knowledge
          Philosophical theology
          Ethics
          Craig, Edward
      ab: Why is it useful to talk and think about knowledge‐how? Using Edward Craig's discussion of the function of the concepts of knowledge as a jumping off point, this paper argues that considering this question can offer us new angles on the debate about knowledge‐how. We consider two candidate functions for the concept of knowledge‐how: pooling capacities and mutual reliance. Craig makes the case for pooling capacities, which connects knowledge‐how to our need to pool practical capacities. I argue that the evidence is much more equivocal and in fact supports both functions. I propose that the concept of knowledge‐how plays both functions, meaning that it is inconsistent and that the debate about knowledge‐how is at least partly a metalinguistic negotiation. In closing, I suggest a way to revise the philosophical concept of knowledge how.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: Y
      custom: Copyright of European Journal of Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.
      item: European Journal of Philosophy
      holder: Wiley-Blackwell
      dt:
        @attributes:
          year: 2019
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N