Kodėl etikai reikia metafizikos?

The aim of this paper is to show that Ronald Dworkin’s objective to isolate ethics from metaphysics is not sufficiently grounded, and a certain metaphysics is inherent even in his own position of autonomous ethics. While opposing those thinkers who seek to ground ethics by finding an external – neut...

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Publicado en:Problems / Problemos Vol. 96; pp. 8 - 23
Autor principal: Noreikaitė, Aistė
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Vilnius University 2019
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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      dt: 2019
      vid: 96
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      pub: Vilnius University
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        10.15388/Problemos.96.1
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        atl: Kodėl etikai reikia metafizikos?
      aug:
        au: Noreikaitė, Aistė
        affil: Vilniaus universiteto Filosofijos istorijos ir analitinės filosofijos katedra.
      su:
        Metaphysics
        Ethics
        Contradiction
      sug:
        subj:
          Metaphysics
          Ethics
          Contradiction
      keyword:
        ethical subject
        ethics
        metaphysics
        Ronald Dworkin
        etika
        etinis subjektas
        metafizika
        Ronaldas Dworkinas
      ab:
        The aim of this paper is to show that Ronald Dworkin’s objective to isolate ethics from metaphysics is not sufficiently grounded, and a certain metaphysics is inherent even in his own position of autonomous ethics. While opposing those thinkers who seek to ground ethics by finding an external – neutral and non-evaluative – ground, Dworkin identifies this externality to ethics with metaphysics and aims to show its fallibility. However, such a conception of metaphysics seems to be too narrow and one-sided and leads his own position into contradictions. This paper aims to demonstrate these contradictions and to argue that even the position that is inner to ethics and stems from a first-person agent’s perspective can only be developed while considering such metaphysical ideas as freedom, dignity, person.
        Straipsnio tikslas – parodyti, kad Ronaldo Dworkino siekis atriboti etiką nuo metafizikos nėra iki galo pagrįstas ir metafizika būdinga net jo paties ginamai autonomiškos etikos pozicijai. Kritikuodamas mąstytojus, kurie siekia etiką pagrįsti jai „išoriškais“ – neutraliais, nevertybiškais – būdais, Dworkinas patį šio „išoriškumo“ etikai siekį sutapatina su metafizika ir siekia parodyti jo klaidingumą. Vis dėlto tokia siaura ir vienpusiška metafizikos samprata jo paties poziciją atveda iki vidinių prieštaravimų. Straipsniu siekiama atskleisti šiuos vidinius prieštaravimus bei parodyti, kad net etikai „vidinė“ pozicija, grindžiama veikėjo ar pirmojo asmens perspektyva, gali būti plėtojama tik drauge svarstant tokias būtent metafizines sąvokas kaip laisvė, orumas ar asmuo.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: Lithuanian
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      custom: Copyright of Problems / Problemos is the property of Vilnius University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.
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