The Duty of Knowing Oneself as One Appears: A Response to Kant’s Problem of Moral Self-Knowledge.
A challenge to Kant’s less known duty of self-knowledge comes from his own firm view that it is impossible to know oneself. This paper resolves this problem by considering the duty of self-knowledge as involving the pursuit of knowledge of oneself as one appears in the empirical world. First, I argu...
| Publicado en: | Problems / Problemos Vol. 96; pp. 23 - 36 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Vilnius University
2019
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=140098567&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 140098567 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 13921126 3D4C jtl: Problems / Problemos issn: 13921126 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: 2019 vid: 96 pid: 16037 pub: Vilnius University artinfo: ui: 140098567 10.15388/Problemos.96.2 ppf: 23 ppct: 13 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 2.3MB tig: atl: The Duty of Knowing Oneself as One Appears: A Response to Kant’s Problem of Moral Self-Knowledge. aug: au: Radhakrishnan, Vivek Kumar affil: Manipal Centre for Humanities, Manipal Academy of Higher Education (MAHE), India. su: Theory of self-knowledge Duty Anthropology Empirical research sug: subj: Theory of self-knowledge Duty Anthropology Empirical research keyword: empirical anthropology Kant moral duty self-knowledge empirinė antropologija Kantas moralinė pareiga savižina ab: A challenge to Kant’s less known duty of self-knowledge comes from his own firm view that it is impossible to know oneself. This paper resolves this problem by considering the duty of self-knowledge as involving the pursuit of knowledge of oneself as one appears in the empirical world. First, I argue that, although Kant places severe restrictions on the possibility of knowing oneself as one is, he admits the possibility of knowing oneself as one appears using methods from empirical anthropology. Second, I show that empirical knowledge of oneself is fairly reliable and is, in fact, considered as morally significant from Kant’s moral anthropological perspective. Taking these points together, I conclude that Kant’s duty of self-knowledge exclusively entails the pursuit of empirical self-knowledge. Mažiau dėmesio sulaukusiai Kanto savižinos pareigai iššūkį meta paties filosofo tvirtas įsitikinimas, jog žmogus savęs pažinti negali. Šiame straipsnyje ši problema išsprendžiama traktuojant savižinos pareigą kaip tokią, kur žinojimo apie save siekiama save suprantant kaip empiriniame pasaulyje pasireiškiantį žmogų. Pirmiausia teigiama, kad nors Kantas stipriai apriboja galimybę žmogui pažinti save tokį, koks jis yra, filosofas pripažįsta esant galimybę žmogui, naudojantis empirinės antropologijos metodais, pažinti save tokį, koks jis pasireiškia. Antra, straipsnyje parodoma, kad empirinė savižina yra pakankamai patikima ir netgi laikytina morališkai reikšminga remiantis Kanto moralinės antropologijos požiūriu. Sujungiant abu šiuos punktus, straipsnyje daroma išvada, jog Kanto savižinos pareiga reiškia ne daugiau negu empirinės savižinos paieškas. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Problems / Problemos is the property of Vilnius University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Problems / Problemos holder: Vilnius University dt: @attributes: year: 2019 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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