Price Caps as Welfare-Enhancing Coopetition.
The paper analyzes the impact of price caps agreed upon by industry participants. Price caps, like mergers, allow firms to solve Cournot's multiple-marginalization problem, but unlike mergers, they do not stifle price competition in case of substitutes or facilitate foreclosure in case of complement...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Political Economy Vol. 127; no. 6; pp. 000 - 1 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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University of Chicago Press
Dec2019
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=140275413&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 140275413 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00223808 JPE jtl: Journal of Political Economy issn: 00223808 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2019 vid: 127 iid: 6 pid: 415 pub: University of Chicago Press artinfo: ui: 140275413 10.1086/702014 ppf: 000 ppct: 1 formats: tig: atl: Price Caps as Welfare-Enhancing Coopetition. aug: au: Rey, Patrick Tirole, Jean affil: Toulouse School of Economics, Université Toulouse Capitole Toulouse School of Economics and Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse su: Price regulation Coopetition Demand function Cost functions Foreclosure sug: subj: Regulation, Licensing, and Inspection of Miscellaneous Commercial Sectors Price regulation Coopetition Demand function Cost functions Foreclosure ab: The paper analyzes the impact of price caps agreed upon by industry participants. Price caps, like mergers, allow firms to solve Cournot's multiple-marginalization problem, but unlike mergers, they do not stifle price competition in case of substitutes or facilitate foreclosure in case of complements. The paper first demonstrates this for nonrepeated interaction and general demand and cost functions. It then shows that allowing price caps has no impact on investment and entry in case of substitutes. Under more restrictive assumptions, the paper finally generalizes the insights to repeated price interaction, analyzing coordinated effects when goods are not necessarily substitutes. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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