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Historical Inductions Meet the Material Theory.

Historical inductions, that is, the pessimistic metainduction and the problem of unconceived alternatives, are critically analyzed via John D. Norton's material theory of induction and subsequently rejected as noncogent arguments. It is suggested that the material theory is amenable to a local versi...

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Publicado en:Philosophy of Science Vol. 86; no. 5; pp. 918 - 930
Autor principal: Shech, Elay
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Cambridge University Press Dec2019
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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      ab: Historical inductions, that is, the pessimistic metainduction and the problem of unconceived alternatives, are critically analyzed via John D. Norton's material theory of induction and subsequently rejected as noncogent arguments. It is suggested that the material theory is amenable to a local version of the pessimistic metainduction, for example, in the context of some medical studies.
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