Epistemic Virtues, Metavirtues, and Computational Complexity.
The article suggests a shift in emphasis in the discussion of the internalism/externalism distinction in epistemology. Most discussions take the essential feature of states and processes susceptible to internalistic norms to be knowability—a person can know "from the inside" whether they are in the...
| Publicado en: | Nous (0029-4624) Vol. 38; no. 3; pp. 481 - 503 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Sep2004
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=14032760&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 14032760 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00294624 D97 jtl: Nous (0029-4624) issn: 00294624 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Sep2004 vid: 38 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 14032760 10.1111/j.0029-4624.2004.00479.x ppf: 481 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 154KB tig: atl: Epistemic Virtues, Metavirtues, and Computational Complexity. aug: au: Morton, Adam affil: 1 University of Alberta su: Externalism (Philosophy of mind) Theory of knowledge Social epistemology Internalization (Social psychology) Reason Philosophy sug: subj: Externalism (Philosophy of mind) Theory of knowledge Social epistemology Internalization (Social psychology) Reason Philosophy ab: The article suggests a shift in emphasis in the discussion of the internalism/externalism distinction in epistemology. Most discussions take the essential feature of states and processes susceptible to internalistic norms to be knowability—a person can know "from the inside" whether they are in the relevant states. The significance of this information is that the person can then judge and correct her reasoning in the light of what she knows about her state and her grasp of the relevant principles of rationality. But the reflections just above and elsewhere in the paper suggest that the important fact is not whether one knows what state one is in but whether one knows whether it is in accord with some inferential principle that makes it likely to result in true belief. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Nous (0029-4624) is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Nous (0029-4624) holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2004 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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