Humean Laws and (Nested) Counterfactuals.

Humean reductionism about laws of nature is the view that the laws reduce to the total distribution of non-modal or categorical properties in spacetime. A worry about Humean reductionism is that it cannot motivate the characteristic modal resilience of laws under counterfactual suppositions and that...

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Publicado en:Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 70; no. 278; pp. 93 - 114
Autores principales: Loew, Christian, Jaag, Siegfried
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Oxford University Press / USA Jan2020
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Humean Laws and (Nested) Counterfactuals.
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        au:
          Loew, Christian
          Jaag, Siegfried
        affil:
          Universität zu Köln, Germany
          Universität Düsseldorf, Germany
      su:
        Counterfactuals (Logic)
        Reductionism
        Electrons
        Physical laws
        Semantics
      sug:
        subj:
          Counterfactuals (Logic)
          Reductionism
          Electrons
          Physical laws
          Semantics
      keyword:
        best systems account
        counterfactuals
        Humeanism
        laws of nature
      ab: Humean reductionism about laws of nature is the view that the laws reduce to the total distribution of non-modal or categorical properties in spacetime. A worry about Humean reductionism is that it cannot motivate the characteristic modal resilience of laws under counterfactual suppositions and that it thus generates wrong verdicts about certain nested counterfactuals. In this paper, we defend Humean reductionism by motivating an account of the modal resilience of Humean laws that gets nested counterfactuals right.
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    language: English
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