Welfare‐enhancing Trade Unions in an Oligopoly with Excessive Entry.
Trade unions are often argued to cause allocative inefficiencies and to lower welfare. We analyze whether this evaluation is also justified in a Cournot‐oligopoly with free but costly entry. If input markets are competitive and output per firm declines with the number of firms (business stealing), t...
| Publicado en: | Manchester School (1463-6786) Vol. 88; no. 1; pp. 60 - 91 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jan2020
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=140461888&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 140461888 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 14636786 MSE jtl: Manchester School (1463-6786) issn: 14636786 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jan2020 vid: 88 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 140461888 10.1111/manc.12288 ppf: 60 ppct: 31 formats: tig: atl: Welfare‐enhancing Trade Unions in an Oligopoly with Excessive Entry. aug: au: de Pinto, Marco Goerke, Laszlo affil: IUBH University of Applied Science and IAAEU Trier IAAEU Trier and Trier University, IZA Bonn and CESifo München su: Labor unions Collective bargaining Oligopolies Bargaining power Demand function sug: subj: Labor unions Collective bargaining Oligopolies Labor Unions and Similar Labor Organizations Bargaining power Demand function ab: Trade unions are often argued to cause allocative inefficiencies and to lower welfare. We analyze whether this evaluation is also justified in a Cournot‐oligopoly with free but costly entry. If input markets are competitive and output per firm declines with the number of firms (business stealing), there is excessive entry into such oligopoly. If trade unions raise wages above the competitive level, output and profits per firm decline, which could deter entry and thus improve welfare. We find that an increase in the union's bargaining power raises welfare if the (inverse) demand curve is (sufficiently) concave. We also show that collective bargaining loosens the linkage between business stealing and excessive entry. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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