The Normative Force of Logical and Probabilistic Reasoning in Improving Beliefs.
There is a deep tension between logical and probabilistic norms of belief. This article illustrates the normative force that is associated with these frameworks by showing how rather unrestricted belief bases can be improved by undergoing logical and probabilistic reflection. It is argued that proba...
| Published in: | Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy Vol. 85; no. 6; pp. 435 - 459 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Dec2019
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=140955572&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 140955572 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00405825 HL0 jtl: Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy issn: 00405825 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Dec2019 vid: 85 iid: 6 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 140955572 10.1111/theo.12214 ppf: 435 ppct: 24 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 247KB tig: atl: The Normative Force of Logical and Probabilistic Reasoning in Improving Beliefs. aug: au: Strössner, Corina affil: Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf su: Theory of knowledge Axioms Probability theory Conjunctions (Grammar) Language & languages sug: subj: Theory of knowledge Axioms Probability theory Conjunctions (Grammar) Language & languages keyword: commitment deductive closure lottery paradox preface paradox probabilistic reasoning uncertainty ab: There is a deep tension between logical and probabilistic norms of belief. This article illustrates the normative force that is associated with these frameworks by showing how rather unrestricted belief bases can be improved by undergoing logical and probabilistic reflection. It is argued that probabilistic reasoning accounts for the reliability of the conclusions one can draw from the beliefs. Most importantly, reliability commands us to care for the increasing uncertainty of conjunctions of beliefs. Deductive logic captures the agent's commitment towards all conclusions of her beliefs. In other words, it seems that commitment forces the agent to believe conclusions, which reliability tells her to view with scepticism. This conflict is resolved by arguing that commitment merely forces the agent to find the logical conclusions of her beliefs acceptable, not necessarily to believe them. This demands consistency but no deductive closure. Furthermore, it is shown that by restoring consistency, a straightforward connection between high subjective probability and full belief is undermined. Finally, the article delineates how this approach deals with the lottery paradox and the preface paradox. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2019 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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