Fairness and the Unselfish Demand for Redistribution by Taxpayers and Welfare Recipients.
We theoretically illustrate how the aversion to unfairness triggers an unselfish though rational demand for redistribution. This leads the well‐off to demand positive tax rates and the "poor" to reject extreme progressivity. We prove that the "rich" and the "poor" adjust their demand for redistribut...
| Publicado en: | Southern Economic Journal Vol. 86; no. 3; pp. 971 - 989 |
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| Autores principales: | , , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jan2020
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=141033405&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 141033405 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00384038 SEJ jtl: Southern Economic Journal issn: 00384038 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2020 vid: 86 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 141033405 10.1002/soej.12416 ppf: 971 ppct: 18 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 149KB tig: atl: Fairness and the Unselfish Demand for Redistribution by Taxpayers and Welfare Recipients. aug: au: Sabatini, Fabio Ventura, Marco Yamamura, Eiji Zamparelli, Luca affil: Department of Economics and Law, Sapienza University of Rome, Via del Castro Laurenziano 9, 00161 Rome Italy and IZA, Bonn, Germany Department of Economics and Law, Sapienza University of Rome, Via del Castro Laurenziano 9, 00161, Rome Italy Department of Economics, Seinan Gakuin University, 6 Chome‐2‐92 Nishijin, Sawara Ward, Fukuoka 814‐0002, Japan Department of Economics and Law, Sapienza University of Rome, Via del Castro Laurenziano 9 00161, Rome Italy su: Italy Fairness Tax rates Aversion sug: subj: Fairness Italy Tax rates Aversion ab: We theoretically illustrate how the aversion to unfairness triggers an unselfish though rational demand for redistribution. This leads the well‐off to demand positive tax rates and the "poor" to reject extreme progressivity. We prove that the "rich" and the "poor" adjust their demand for redistribution in opposite ways when their sensitivity to fairness increases: while agents with above average expected income raise their demand for redistribution, agents with below average income lower it. We then provide empirical evidence of these behaviors using a nationally representative survey from Italy. The estimates confirm that a stronger aversion to unfair distributive outcomes is associated with a higher support for redistribution by individuals with high income and to a lower demand for redistribution by those with low income. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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