Why DCD Donors Are Dead.
Critics of organ donation after circulatory death (DCD) argue that, even if donors are past the point of autoresuscitation, they have not satisfied the "irreversibility" requirement in the circulatory and respiratory criteria for determining death, since their circulation and respiration could be ar...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Medicine & Philosophy Vol. 45; no. 1; pp. 42 - 61 |
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| Formato: | Journal Article |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Feb2020
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=141171713&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 141171713 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 03605310 MPS jtl: Journal of Medicine & Philosophy issn: 03605310 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Feb2020 vid: 45 iid: 1 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 141171713 10.1093/jmp/jhz030 ppf: 42 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 151KB tig: atl: Why DCD Donors Are Dead. aug: au: Lizza, John P affil: Kutztown University of Pennsylvania, Kutztown, Pennsylvania, USA su: Do-not-resuscitate orders Organ donation Proof & certification of death Organ donors Loss of consciousness sug: subj: Do-not-resuscitate orders Organ donation Proof & certification of death Organ donors Loss of consciousness keyword: death irreversibility organ donation organ transplantation ab: Critics of organ donation after circulatory death (DCD) argue that, even if donors are past the point of autoresuscitation, they have not satisfied the "irreversibility" requirement in the circulatory and respiratory criteria for determining death, since their circulation and respiration could be artificially restored. Thus, removing their vital organs violates the "dead-donor" rule. I defend DCD donation against this criticism. I argue that practical medical-ethical considerations, including respect for do-not-resuscitate orders, support interpreting "irreversibility" to mean permanent cessation of circulation and respiration. Assuming a consciousness-related formulation of human death, I then argue that the loss of circulation and respiration is significant, because it leads to the permanent loss of consciousness and thus to the death of the human person. The DNR request by an organ donor should thus be interpreted to mean "do not restore to consciousness." Finally, I respond to an objection that if "irreversibility" has a medical-ethical meaning, it would entail the absurd possibility that one of two individuals in the same physical state could be alive and the other dead-an implication that some think is inconsistent with understanding death as an objective biological state of the organism. I argue that advances in medical technology have created phenomena that challenge the assumption that human death can be understood in strictly biological terms. I argue that ethical and ontological considerations about our nature bear on the definition and determination of death and thus on the permissibility of DCD. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Journal Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: © 2019 Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Inc.. item: Journal of Medicine & Philosophy holder: Oxford University Press / USA dt: @attributes: year: 2020 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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