Whistleblowing vs. Random Audit: An Experimental Test of Relative Efficiency.

SUMMARY This paper reports an experimental test of the relative efficiency of a whistleblowing‐based audit scheme compared to a random‐based audit scheme. We design a between‐subjects laboratory experiment with two treatments: a benchmark with a random‐based audit scheme and an alternative treatment...

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Publicado en:Kyklos Vol. 73; no. 1; pp. 47 - 68
Autores principales: Bazart, Cécile, Beaud, Mickael, Dubois, Dimitri
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Feb2020
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Whistleblowing vs. Random Audit: An Experimental Test of Relative Efficiency.
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        au:
          Bazart, Cécile
          Beaud, Mickael
          Dubois, Dimitri
        affil: CEE‐M, Université de Montpellier, CNRS, INRA, SupAgro, Avenue Raymond Dugrand, CS 59640, 34960, Montpellier cedex 2 France
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        Whistleblowing
        Tax evasion
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        subj:
          Whistleblowing
          Tax evasion
      ab: SUMMARY This paper reports an experimental test of the relative efficiency of a whistleblowing‐based audit scheme compared to a random‐based audit scheme. We design a between‐subjects laboratory experiment with two treatments: a benchmark with a random‐based audit scheme and an alternative treatment in which taxpayers can blow the whistle. Compared to the benchmark, the whistleblowing‐based audit scheme (i) improves the targeting of evaders, (ii) decreases the monetary amount of tax evasion, and (iii) raises the tax levy.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
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    language: English
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