The Consciousness of Embodied Cognition, Affordances, and the Brain.
Tony Chemero advances the radical thesis that cognition and consciousness are actually the same thing. I question this conclusion. Even if we are the brain–body environmental synergies that Chemero and others claim, we will not be able to conclude that consciousness is just cognition because this vi...
| Publicado en: | Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy Vol. 39; no. 1; pp. 23 - 34 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Feb2020
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=141318724&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 141318724 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01677411 NM2 jtl: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy issn: 01677411 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Feb2020 vid: 39 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 141318724 10.1007/s11245-017-9503-7 ppf: 23 ppct: 11 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 708KB tig: atl: The Consciousness of Embodied Cognition, Affordances, and the Brain. aug: au: Hardcastle, Valerie Gray affil: Departments of Philosophy, Psychology, and Psychiatry & Behavioral Neuroscience, Weaver Institute for Law and Psychiatry, University of Cincinnati, ML0374, 45221-0374, Cincinnati, OH, USA su: Consciousness Cognition Dissociative identity disorder Action research sug: subj: Consciousness Cognition Dissociative identity disorder Action research keyword: Brain Embodied cognition Projection Synergy ab: Tony Chemero advances the radical thesis that cognition and consciousness are actually the same thing. I question this conclusion. Even if we are the brain–body environmental synergies that Chemero and others claim, we will not be able to conclude that consciousness is just cognition because this view actually expands cognition beyond being the sort of natural kind upon which to hook phenomenal experience. Identifying consciousness with cognition either means consciousness exists at multiple levels of organization in the universe, or more work needs to be done to delineate conscious cognition from other synergies. Still, while radical embodied cognition does not solve any of the hard problems associated with consciousness, this perspective allows useful insights concerning phenomenal experience. Moreover, recent neuropsychological research in action selection and projection can help us refine notions of consciousness from this embodied perspective. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy is a copyright of Springer, 2020. All Rights Reserved. item: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2020 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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