Content Pragmatism Defended.
In the literature on the nature and role of cognitive representation, three positions are taken across the conceptual landscape: robust realism, primitivism, and eliminativism. Recently, a fourth alternative that tries to avoid the shortcomings of traditional views has been proposed: content pragmat...
| Publicado en: | Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy Vol. 39; no. 1; pp. 103 - 114 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Feb2020
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=141318725&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 141318725 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01677411 NM2 jtl: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy issn: 01677411 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Feb2020 vid: 39 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 141318725 10.1007/s11245-017-9504-6 ppf: 103 ppct: 11 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 692KB tig: atl: Content Pragmatism Defended. aug: au: Coelho Mollo, Dimitri affil: Department of Philosophy, King's College London, Strand, WC2R 2LS, London, UK Institut für Philosophie, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Unter den Linden 6, 10099, Berlin, Germany su: Mental representation Cognitive science Pragmatism Philosophy of science Realism sug: subj: Mental representation Cognitive science Pragmatism Philosophy of science Realism keyword: Content pragmatism Philosophy of cognitive science Representation in cognitive science Representational content ab: In the literature on the nature and role of cognitive representation, three positions are taken across the conceptual landscape: robust realism, primitivism, and eliminativism. Recently, a fourth alternative that tries to avoid the shortcomings of traditional views has been proposed: content pragmatism. My aim is to defend pragmatism about content against some recent objections moved against the view. According to these objections, content pragmatism (a) fails to capture the role played by representation in the cognitive sciences; and/or (b) is an unstable view that ends up collapsing into one of the traditional alternatives. I argue that those arguments fail. I show that content pragmatism has as much claim to descriptive adequacy as the traditional theories. Moreover, I defend the robustness of the view by arguing that it does not collapse into any of the traditional positions. Content pragmatism therefore offers a valid and coherent account of the nature of representational content. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy is a copyright of Springer, 2020. All Rights Reserved. item: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2020 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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