Foucault, Normativity, and Freedom: A Reappraisal.

The aim of this article is to contribute to the recently revived debate over the normativity of Foucault's genealogical method. More specifically, I shall respond to Fraser's charge that Foucault's rejection of humanism is unjustified because he cannot state why a totally panopticized, autonomous so...

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Publicado en:Foucault Studies no. 27; pp. 23 - 48
Autor principal: MASCARETTI, GIOVANNI MARIA
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: University of Pennsylvania Press Dec2019
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: MASCARETTI, GIOVANNI MARIA
        affil: University of Kurdistan Hewlêr, Kurdistan Region, Iraq
      su:
        Liberty
        Enlightenment
        Humanism
        Captivity
        Modernity
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          Liberty
          Enlightenment
          Humanism
          Captivity
          Modernity
      keyword:
        critique
        Foucault
        freedom
        normativity
        regime of truth
      ab: The aim of this article is to contribute to the recently revived debate over the normativity of Foucault's genealogical method. More specifically, I shall respond to Fraser's charge that Foucault's rejection of humanism is unjustified because he cannot state why a totally panopticized, autonomous society would be objectionable. After dismissing a non-normative defence strategy of Foucault's work, I shall proceed as follows: firstly, I shall clarify Foucault's model of critique as a practice of problematization geared to free his addressees from their captivation to the system of truths sustaining the power mechanisms of modern biopolitics. Secondly, I shall argue that Fraser's society should be resisted because it would reproduce this regime of captivity, thereby obstructing the exercise of freedom as self-transformation. Thirdly, I shall contend that Foucault's normative orientation to a post-humanist conception of freedom as self-transformation finds a contextual, explanatory account in his attempt to revitalize the emancipatory project of Enlightenment modernity through a transformative problematization of our normative commitments. Moreover, I shall show that the standard of validity of this effort is represented by Foucault's exemplary embodiment of the critical ethos of the Enlightenment in both his style of existence and theoretical activity. Finally, the article terminates by illustrating three shortcomings of Foucault's normative approach.
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