Towards a phenomenological conception of experiential justification.
The aim of this paper is to shed light on and develop what I call a phenomenological conception of experiential justification (PCEJ). According to this phenomenological conception, certain experiences gain their justificatory force from their distinctive phenomenology. Such an approach closely conne...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 197; no. 1; pp. 155 - 184 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jan2020
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=141339550&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 141339550 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2020 vid: 197 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 141339550 10.1007/s11229-018-1744-5 ppf: 155 ppct: 29 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 507KB tig: atl: Towards a phenomenological conception of experiential justification. aug: au: Berghofer, Philipp affil: Department for Philosophy, University of Graz, Heinrichstraße 26/6, 8010, Graz, Austria su: Philosophy of mind Phenomenology Theory of knowledge sug: subj: Philosophy of mind Phenomenology Theory of knowledge keyword: Dogmatism Experiential justification Phenomenal conservatism ab: The aim of this paper is to shed light on and develop what I call a phenomenological conception of experiential justification (PCEJ). According to this phenomenological conception, certain experiences gain their justificatory force from their distinctive phenomenology. Such an approach closely connects epistemology and philosophy of mind and has recently been proposed by several authors, most notably by Elijah Chudnoff, Ole Koksvik, and James Pryor. At the present time, however, there is no work that contrasts these different versions of PCEJ. This paper not only bridges this gap, but also reveals problems in current versions of PCEJ. Consequently, I argue for a new version of PCEJ that focuses on what is given within experience and not on how what is given pushes me towards believing something. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2020. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2020 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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