Motivating dualities.
There exists a common view that for theories related by a 'duality', dual models typically may be taken ab initio to represent the same physical state of affairs, i.e. to correspond to the same possible world. We question this view, by drawing a parallel with the distinction between 'interpretationa...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 197; no. 1; pp. 263 - 292 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Jan2020
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | There exists a common view that for theories related by a 'duality', dual models typically may be taken ab initio to represent the same physical state of affairs, i.e. to correspond to the same possible world. We question this view, by drawing a parallel with the distinction between 'interpretational' and 'motivational' approaches to symmetries. |
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