Learning Concepts: A Learning-Theoretic Solution to the Complex-First Paradox.

Children acquire complex concepts like dog earlier than simple concepts like brown , even though our best neuroscientific theories suggest that learning the former is harder than learning the latter and, thus, should take more time (Markus Werning). This is the complex-first paradox. We present a no...

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Publicado en:Philosophy of Science Vol. 87; no. 1; pp. 135 - 152
Autores principales: Poth, Nina L., Brössel, Peter
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Cambridge University Press Jan2020
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Learning Concepts: A Learning-Theoretic Solution to the Complex-First Paradox.
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          Poth, Nina L.
          Brössel, Peter
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        Concept learning
        Paradox
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          Concept learning
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      ab: Children acquire complex concepts like dog earlier than simple concepts like brown , even though our best neuroscientific theories suggest that learning the former is harder than learning the latter and, thus, should take more time (Markus Werning). This is the complex-first paradox. We present a novel solution to the complex-first paradox. Our solution builds on a generalization of Fei Xu and Joshua B. Tenenbaum's Bayesian model of word learning. By focusing on a rational theory of concept learning, we show that it is easier to infer the meaning of complex concepts than that of simple concepts.
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