A Defense of Low-Probability Scientific Explanations.

I evaluate the plausibility of explanatory elitism, the view that a good scientific explanation of an outcome will show that it was highly probable. I consider an argument from Michael Strevens that elitism is the only view that can account for the historical acceptance of probabilistic theories in...

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Publicado en:Philosophy of Science Vol. 87; no. 1; pp. 91 - 113
Autor principal: Clatterbuck, Hayley
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Cambridge University Press Jan2020
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: Clatterbuck, Hayley
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        Elitism
        Explanation
        Probability theory
        Virtue
        Argument
        Probabilistic number theory
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        subj:
          Elitism
          Explanation
          Probability theory
          Virtue
          Argument
          Probabilistic number theory
      ab: I evaluate the plausibility of explanatory elitism, the view that a good scientific explanation of an outcome will show that it was highly probable. I consider an argument from Michael Strevens that elitism is the only view that can account for the historical acceptance of probabilistic theories in physics. I argue that biology provides better test cases for evaluating elitism and conclude that theories in that domain were favored in virtue of conferring correct, and not necessarily high, probabilities on outcomes.
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    language: English
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