Epistemic theories of objective chance.
Epistemic theories of objective chance hold that chances are idealised epistemic probabilities of some sort. After giving a brief history of this approach to objective chance, I argue for a particular version of this view, that the chance of an event E is its epistemic probability, given maximal kno...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 197; no. 2; pp. 703 - 731 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Feb2020
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=142062000&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 142062000 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Feb2020 vid: 197 iid: 2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 142062000 10.1007/s11229-018-1719-6 ppf: 703 ppct: 28 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 506KB tig: atl: Epistemic theories of objective chance. aug: au: Johns, Richard affil: Department of Philosophy, Langara College, 100 West 49th Avenue, V5Y 2Z6, Vancouver, BC, Canada su: Probability theory Virtues Puzzles Argument sug: subj: Probability theory Virtues Puzzles Argument keyword: Causation Chance Epistemic probability Laws of nature Symmetry ab: Epistemic theories of objective chance hold that chances are idealised epistemic probabilities of some sort. After giving a brief history of this approach to objective chance, I argue for a particular version of this view, that the chance of an event E is its epistemic probability, given maximal knowledge of the possible causes of E. The main argument for this view is the demonstration that it entails all of the commonly-accepted properties of chance. For example, this analysis entails that chances supervene on the physical facts, that the chance function is an expert probability, that the existence of stable frequencies results from invariant chances in repeated experiments, and that chances are probably close to long-run relative frequencies in repeated experiments. Despite these virtues, epistemic approaches to chance have been neglected in recent decades, on account of their conflict with accepted views about closely related topics such as causation, laws of nature, and epistemic probability. However, existing views on these topics are also very problematic, and I believe that the epistemic view of chance is a key piece of this puzzle that, once in place, allows all the other pieces to fit together into a new and coherent way. I also respond to some criticisms of the epistemic theory that I favour. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2020. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2020 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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