Interactionism for the discerning mind?
Jaegwon Kim has developed an argument that interactionist dualists cannot account for the causal relations between minds and brains. This paper develops a closely related argument that focuses instead on the causal relations between minds and neurons. While there are several promising responses to K...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 177; no. 4; pp. 931 - 947 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Apr2020
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=142084038&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 142084038 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2020 vid: 177 iid: 4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 142084038 10.1007/s11098-018-1213-5 ppf: 931 ppct: 16 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 394KB tig: atl: Interactionism for the discerning mind? aug: au: Shiller, Derek affil: Brooklyn, USA su: Dualism Interactionism (Philosophy) Causation (Philosophy) Mind-brain identity theory Neurons sug: subj: Dualism Interactionism (Philosophy) Causation (Philosophy) Mind-brain identity theory Neurons keyword: Interactionism Mental causation Pairing problem ab: Jaegwon Kim has developed an argument that interactionist dualists cannot account for the causal relations between minds and brains. This paper develops a closely related argument that focuses instead on the causal relations between minds and neurons. While there are several promising responses to Kim's argument, their plausibility relies on a relatively simple understanding of mind–brain relations. Once we shift our focus to neurons, these responses lose their appeal. The problem is that even if mind–brain causal pairing can be explained at no great theoretical cost, the complex interactions non-physical minds would need to have with neurons cannot. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2020. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2020 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|