The identity of experiences and the identity of the subject.
Barry Dainton has developed a sophisticated version of the bundle theory of the subject of experiences. I shall focus on three claims Dainton makes: the identity-conditions of subjects can be specified in terms of capacities to produce experiences; the identity-conditions of token capacities are not...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 177; no. 4; pp. 987 - 1006 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Apr2020
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=142084042&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 142084042 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2020 vid: 177 iid: 4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 142084042 10.1007/s11098-018-01226-4 ppf: 987 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 426KB tig: atl: The identity of experiences and the identity of the subject. aug: au: O'Conaill, Donnchadh affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Fribourg, Av. de l'Europe 20, 1700, Fribourg, Switzerland su: Dainton, Barry Consciousness Criminal intent Subjectivity Experience sug: subj: Dainton, Barry Consciousness Criminal intent Subjectivity Experience keyword: C-system Co–consciousness Experiential capacity Identity-conditions Subject ab: Barry Dainton has developed a sophisticated version of the bundle theory of the subject of experiences. I shall focus on three claims Dainton makes: the identity-conditions of subjects can be specified in terms of capacities to produce experiences; the identity-conditions of token capacities are not determined by their subjects; and a subject is nothing over and above a bundle of such capacities. I shall argue that Dainton's key notion of co-consciousness, a primitive relation of experienced togetherness, presupposes a subject common to each of the experiences which are experienced together. Therefore, co-consciousness cannot be used to state the identity-conditions of subjects in a non-circular manner. I shall also argue that none of the different options Dainton offers for specifying the identity-conditions of token experiential capacities independently of their subjects are successful. I shall then outline a way in which this can be done, but argue that it undermines the claim that a subject is nothing over and above a bundle of such capacities. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2020. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2020 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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