Cognitive self-management requires the phenomenal registration of intrinsic state properties.
Cognition is not, and could not possibly be, entirely representational in character. There is also a phenomenal form of cognitive expression that registers the intrinsic properties of mental states themselves. Arguments against the reality of this intrinsic phenomenal dimension to mental experience...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 177; no. 4; pp. 1113 - 1136 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Apr2020
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=142084048&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 142084048 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2020 vid: 177 iid: 4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 142084048 10.1007/s11098-018-01237-1 ppf: 1113 ppct: 23 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 452KB tig: atl: Cognitive self-management requires the phenomenal registration of intrinsic state properties. aug: au: Peters, Frederic affil: Psychology Department, University of New England, Armidale, Australia su: Self-management (Psychology) Cognition Subjectivity Criminal intent Phenomenalism sug: subj: Self-management (Psychology) Cognition Subjectivity Criminal intent Phenomenalism keyword: Executive control Intrinsic Phenomenal Representation Self-management ab: Cognition is not, and could not possibly be, entirely representational in character. There is also a phenomenal form of cognitive expression that registers the intrinsic properties of mental states themselves. Arguments against the reality of this intrinsic phenomenal dimension to mental experience have focused either on its supposed impossibility (since the brain possesses no such properties), or secondly, the non-appearance of any such qualities to introspection. This paper argues to the contrary, that the registration of cognitive state properties does take place independently of representational content; and necessarily so, since it supports an independent function—self-management. Given the fact that unlike a computer, the brain must, of necessity, operate itself, it needs to be in touch with itself to do so. Intrinsic phenomenal forms of cognitive expression allow the brain to do just that by registering characteristics of the cognitive states themselves. Self-management might well prove to constitute the prime reason for the emergence of subjectivity itself. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2020. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2020 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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