Toward a Perceptual Account of Mindreading.

A number of philosophers argue that consistent with the phenomenology of everyday mindreading, appropriately endowed observers are sometimes able to visually perceive that someone is angry. Call this view the Perceptual Account of Mindreading (PA). The paper starts by exploring the merits and limits...

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Publicado en:Philosophy & Phenomenological Research Vol. 100; no. 2; pp. 380 - 402
Autor principal: Varga, Somogy
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Mar2020
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        affil: University of Memphis
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        Telepathy
        Social theory
        Philosophers
        Phenomenology
        Visual perception
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          Social theory
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          Visual perception
      ab: A number of philosophers argue that consistent with the phenomenology of everyday mindreading, appropriately endowed observers are sometimes able to visually perceive that someone is angry. Call this view the Perceptual Account of Mindreading (PA). The paper starts by exploring the merits and limits of the main strategies that have been employed to defend PA. The second aim is to present and defend a version of PA, according to which some mental properties can be observational properties. Providing support for this thesis includes a shift of focus to properties presented in perceptual experience and a systematic examination of a body of recent empirical material on animacy perception and visual aftereffects.
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