Why metaphysical debates are not merely verbal (or how to have a non-verbal metaphysical debate).
A number of philosophers have argued in recent years that certain kinds of metaphysical debates—e.g., debates over the existence of past and future objects, mereological sums, and coincident objects—are merely verbal. (Roughly speaking, a merely verbal dispute is one in which the two parties to the...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 197; no. 3; pp. 1181 - 1202 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Mar2020
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=142270087&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 142270087 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2020 vid: 197 iid: 3 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 142270087 10.1007/s11229-017-1375-2 ppf: 1181 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 458KB tig: atl: Why metaphysical debates are not merely verbal (or how to have a non-verbal metaphysical debate). aug: au: Balaguer, Mark affil: Department of Philosophy, California State University, Los Angeles, CA, USA su: Debate Philosophical literature sug: subj: Debate Philosophical literature keyword: Merely verbal disputes Metametaphysics Metaontology Ontology ab: A number of philosophers have argued in recent years that certain kinds of metaphysical debates—e.g., debates over the existence of past and future objects, mereological sums, and coincident objects—are merely verbal. (Roughly speaking, a merely verbal dispute is one in which the two parties to the dispute don't disagree about any non-verbal facts and only seem to disagree because they mean different things by their words.) It is argued in this paper that metaphysical debates (of a certain very broad kind) are not merely verbal. The paper proceeds by uncovering and describing a pattern that can be found in a very wide range of philosophical problems and then explaining how, in connection with any problem of this general kind, there is always a non-verbal debate to be had. Indeed, the paper provides a recipe for locating the non-verbal debates that surround these philosophical problems. This undermines metametaphysical verbalist views of our metaphysical questions—i.e., views that say that there is no non-verbal debate to be had about some metaphysical question. Finally, the paper also provides a quick argument against actual-literature verbalist views of our metaphysical questions; in other words, the paper argues that in connection with all of our metaphysical questions, it is easy to find examples of non-verbal debates in the actual philosophical literature. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2020. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2020 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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