Dynamic competition with network externalities: how history matters.
We consider dynamic competition among platforms in a market with network externalities. A platform that dominated the market in the previous period becomes "focal" in the current period, in that agents play the equilibrium in which they join the focal platform whenever such equilibrium exists. Yet w...
| Publicado en: | RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 51; no. 1; pp. 3 - 32 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Mar2020
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=142357287&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 142357287 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 07416261 56RJ jtl: RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) issn: 07416261 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Mar2020 vid: 51 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 142357287 10.1111/1756-2171.12304 ppf: 3 ppct: 29 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 511KB tig: atl: Dynamic competition with network externalities: how history matters. aug: au: Halaburda, Hanna Jullien, Bruno Yehezkel, Yaron affil: New York University Toulouse School of Economics, CNRS, Toulouse Coller School of Management, Tel‐Aviv University su: Externalities Charities Time perspective Multilevel marketing Equilibrium sug: subj: Externalities Charities Other Grantmaking and Giving Services Time perspective Multilevel marketing Equilibrium ab: We consider dynamic competition among platforms in a market with network externalities. A platform that dominated the market in the previous period becomes "focal" in the current period, in that agents play the equilibrium in which they join the focal platform whenever such equilibrium exists. Yet when faced with higher‐quality competition, can a low‐quality platform remain focal? In the finite‐horizon case, the unique equilibrium is efficient for "patient" platforms; with an infinite time horizon, however, there are multiple equilibria where either the low‐ or high‐quality platform dominates. If qualities are stochastic, the platform with a better average quality wins with a higher probability, even when its realized quality is lower, and this probability increases as platforms become more patient. Hence, social welfare may decline as platforms become more forward looking. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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