The Retribution-Gap and Responsibility-Loci Related to Robots and Automated Technologies: A Reply to Nyholm.
Automated technologies and robots make decisions that cannot always be fully controlled or predicted. In addition to that, they cannot respond to punishment and blame in the ways humans do. Therefore, when automated cars harm or kill people, for example, this gives rise to concerns about responsibil...
| Publicado en: | Science & Engineering Ethics Vol. 26; no. 2; pp. 727 - 736 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Apr2020
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=142384113&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 142384113 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 13533452 GNI jtl: Science & Engineering Ethics issn: 13533452 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2020 vid: 26 iid: 2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 142384113 10.1007/s11948-019-00120-4 ppf: 727 ppct: 9 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 510KB tig: atl: The Retribution-Gap and Responsibility-Loci Related to Robots and Automated Technologies: A Reply to Nyholm. aug: au: de Jong, Roos affil: Rathenau Instituut, The Hague, The Netherlands su: Human beings Robots Driverless cars Mechatronics Surgical robots Decision making sug: subj: Human beings Robots Driverless cars Mechatronics Surgical robots Decision making keyword: Agency Human–robot collaborations Responsibility-gaps Retribution-gaps ab: Automated technologies and robots make decisions that cannot always be fully controlled or predicted. In addition to that, they cannot respond to punishment and blame in the ways humans do. Therefore, when automated cars harm or kill people, for example, this gives rise to concerns about responsibility-gaps and retribution-gaps. According to Sven Nyholm, however, automated cars do not pose a challenge on human responsibility, as long as humans can control them (even if only indirectly) and update them. He argues that the agency exercised in automated cars should be understood in terms of human–robot collaborations. This brief note focuses on the problem that arises when there are multiple people involved, but there is no obvious shared collaboration among them. Building on John Danaher's discussion of command responsibility, it is argued that, although Nyholm might be right that autonomous cars cannot be regarded as acting on their own, independently of any human beings, worries about responsibility-gaps and retribution-gaps are still justified, because it often remains unclear how to allocate or distribute responsibility satisfactorily among the key humans involved after they have been successfully identified. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Science & Engineering Ethics is a copyright of Springer, 2020. All Rights Reserved. item: Science & Engineering Ethics holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2020 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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