Cover Image
QR Code

Insecure Resources, Bilateral Trade, and Endogenous Predation: A Game‐Theoretic Analysis of Conflict and Trade.

This article analyzes how interstate conflict over resources affects the incentives to trade and how greater trade openness affects the endogenous decisions of arming by enemy countries. We identify conditions under which there is trade between two adversary countries and show that each adversary's...

Full description

Published in:Southern Economic Journal Vol. 86; no. 4; pp. 1338 - 1372
Main Authors: Chang, Yang‐Ming, Wu, Shih‐Jye
Format: Article
Published: Wiley-Blackwell Apr2020
Subjects:
Commerce
Predation
Exports
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=142633386&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: ssf
    uiTerm: 142633386
    longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson)
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        00384038
        SEJ
      jtl: Southern Economic Journal
      issn: 00384038
      maglogo: N
    pubinfo:
      dt: Apr2020
      vid: 86
      iid: 4
      pid: 480
      pub: Wiley-Blackwell
    artinfo:
      ui:
        142633386
        10.1002/soej.12430
      ppf: 1338
      ppct: 34
      formats:
        fmt:
          – @attributes:
              type: T
          – @attributes:
              type: C
          – @attributes:
              type: P
              size: 703KB
      tig:
        atl: Insecure Resources, Bilateral Trade, and Endogenous Predation: A Game‐Theoretic Analysis of Conflict and Trade.
      aug:
        au:
          Chang, Yang‐Ming
          Wu, Shih‐Jye
        affil:
          Department of Economics, Kansas State University, 319 Waters Hall, Manhattan KS 66506‐4001,, USA
          Department of Political Economy, National Sun Yat‐Sen University, Kaohsiung 80424,, Taiwan
      su:
        Commerce
        Predation
        Exports
      sug:
        subj:
          Commerce
          Predation
          Exports
      ab: This article analyzes how interstate conflict over resources affects the incentives to trade and how greater trade openness affects the endogenous decisions of arming by enemy countries. We identify conditions under which there is trade between two adversary countries and show that each adversary's arming affects domestic welfare in three different ways. The first is an export‐revenue effect, which increases welfare because arming causes export revenue to go up (i.e., there is an arming‐induced terms‐of‐trade improvement). The second is a resource‐predation effect, which increases welfare because arming increases the appropriation of a rival country's resource input to produce a consumption good. The third is an output‐distortion effect, which reduces welfare because arming lowers the domestic production of civilian goods. Based on these effects, we show circumstances in which greater trade openness reduces the intensity of arming. We also discuss the implications of resource security asymmetry for conflict and trade.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: N
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N