Moral Consistency Reasoning Reconsidered.
Many contemporary ethicists use case-based reasoning to reach consistent beliefs about ethical matters. The idea is that particular cases elicit moral intuitions, which provide defeasible reasons to believe in their content. However, most proponents of case-based moral reasoning are not very explici...
| Publicado en: | Ethical Theory & Moral Practice Vol. 23; no. 1; pp. 107 - 124 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Feb2020
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=142704437&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 142704437 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 13862820 OEY jtl: Ethical Theory & Moral Practice issn: 13862820 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Feb2020 vid: 23 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 142704437 10.1007/s10677-019-10037-3 ppf: 107 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 377KB tig: atl: Moral Consistency Reasoning Reconsidered. aug: au: Paulo, Norbert affil: Department of Social Sciences and Economics, Legal and Social Philosophy, University of Salzburg, Churfürststr. 1, 5020, Salzburg, Austria University of Graz, Institute of Philosophy, Attemsgasse 25, 8010, Graz, Austria su: Case-based reasoning Ethicists Ethics Analogy Problem solving sug: subj: Case-based reasoning Ethicists Ethics Analogy Problem solving keyword: Moral philosophy Moral psychology Practical reasoning Thought experiments ab: Many contemporary ethicists use case-based reasoning to reach consistent beliefs about ethical matters. The idea is that particular cases elicit moral intuitions, which provide defeasible reasons to believe in their content. However, most proponents of case-based moral reasoning are not very explicit about how they resolve inconsistencies and how they abstract principles from judgments about particular cases. The aim of this article is to outline a methodology—called Consistency Reasoning Casuistry—for case-based reasoning in ethics. This methodology draws on Richmond Campbell and Victor Kumar's naturalistic model for the resolution of inconsistencies between the content of intuitions about particular cases. I argue that reasons similar to those that motivate their model also support a more abstract form of moral reasoning that goes beyond mere resolutions of inconsistencies between case judgments and demands the formulation of more abstract moral norms. Consistency Reasoning Casuistry, it is argued, is a good candidate for a methodology for case-based moral reasoning that is in harmony with paradigms of contemporary moral psychology and that can accommodate the methodology implicit in the work of many contemporary ethicists. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Ethical Theory & Moral Practice is a copyright of Springer, 2020. All Rights Reserved. item: Ethical Theory & Moral Practice holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2020 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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