Conditional Degree of Belief and Bayesian Inference.
Why are conditional degrees of belief in an observation E, given a statistical hypothesis H, aligned with the objective probabilities expressed by H? After showing that standard replies (ratio analysis of conditional probability, chance-credence coordination) are not satisfactory, I develop a suppos...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 87; no. 2; pp. 319 - 336 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Apr2020
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=142743434&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 142743434 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2020 vid: 87 iid: 2 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 142743434 10.1086/707554 ppf: 319 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.3MB tig: atl: Conditional Degree of Belief and Bayesian Inference. aug: au: Sprenger, Jan su: Conditional probability Belief & doubt Bayesian analysis Mathematical statistics Conditional expectations sug: subj: Conditional probability Belief & doubt Bayesian analysis Mathematical statistics Conditional expectations ab: Why are conditional degrees of belief in an observation E, given a statistical hypothesis H, aligned with the objective probabilities expressed by H? After showing that standard replies (ratio analysis of conditional probability, chance-credence coordination) are not satisfactory, I develop a suppositional analysis of conditional degree of belief, transferring Ramsey's classical proposal to statistical inference. The analysis saves the alignment, explains the role of chance-credence coordination, and rebuts the charge of arbitrary assessment of evidence in Bayesian inference. Finally, I explore the implications of this analysis for Bayesian reasoning with idealized models in science. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2020 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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