Classical versus Bayesian Statistics.
In statistics, there are two main paradigms: classical and Bayesian statistics. The purpose of this article is to investigate the extent to which classicists and Bayesians can (in some suitable sense of the word) agree. My conclusion is that, in certain situations, they cannot. The upshot is that, i...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 87; no. 2; pp. 302 - 319 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Apr2020
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=142743440&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 142743440 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2020 vid: 87 iid: 2 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 142743440 10.1086/707588 ppf: 302 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.9MB tig: atl: Classical versus Bayesian Statistics. aug: au: Johannesson, Eric su: Null hypothesis Statistics sug: subj: Null hypothesis Statistics ab: In statistics, there are two main paradigms: classical and Bayesian statistics. The purpose of this article is to investigate the extent to which classicists and Bayesians can (in some suitable sense of the word) agree. My conclusion is that, in certain situations, they cannot. The upshot is that, if we assume that the classicist is not allowed to have a higher degree of belief (credence) in a null hypothesis after he has rejected it than before, then (in certain situations) he has to either have trivial or incoherent credences to begin with or fail to update his credences by conditionalization. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2020 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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