Do Nonpartisan Programmatic Policies Have Partisan Electoral Effects? Evidence from Two Large-Scale Experiments.
A vast literature demonstrates that voters around the world who benefit from government discretionary spending increase their electoral support for the incumbent party. But, contrary to theories of political accountability, some suggest that voters also reward incumbent parties for "programmatic" sp...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Politics Vol. 82; no. 2; pp. 714 - 731 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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University of Chicago Press
Apr2020
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=142865954&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 142865954 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00223816 JPO jtl: Journal of Politics issn: 00223816 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2020 vid: 82 iid: 2 pid: 415 pub: University of Chicago Press artinfo: ui: 142865954 10.1086/707059 ppf: 714 ppct: 17 formats: tig: atl: Do Nonpartisan Programmatic Policies Have Partisan Electoral Effects? Evidence from Two Large-Scale Experiments. aug: au: Imai, Kosuke King, Gary Velasco Rivera, Carlos affil: Harvard University Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse su: Government policy Partisanship Elections Discretion Public spending Public support Voters Incumbency (Public officers) sug: subj: Government policy Partisanship Elections Discretion Public spending Public support Public Finance Activities Voters Incumbency (Public officers) ab: A vast literature demonstrates that voters around the world who benefit from government discretionary spending increase their electoral support for the incumbent party. But, contrary to theories of political accountability, some suggest that voters also reward incumbent parties for "programmatic" spending, over which incumbents have no discretion, even when passed with support from all major parties. Why voters would attribute responsibility when none exists is unclear, as is why minority parties would support legislation that costs them votes. We study two prominent programmatic policies. For the first, we design and implement one of the largest randomized social experiments ever. For the second, we reanalyze studies that came to opposite conclusions, using a large-scale randomized experiment and a natural experiment. By improving statistical methods and correcting data errors, we show that evidence from all analyses of both policies is consistent: programmatic policies have no measurable effect on voter support for incumbents. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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