Learning from Conditionals.
In this article, we address a major outstanding question of probabilistic Bayesian epistemology: how should a rational Bayesian agent update their beliefs upon learning an indicative conditional? A number of authors have recently contended that this question is fundamentally underdetermined by Bayes...
| Publicado en: | Mind (0026-4423) Vol. 129; no. 514; pp. 461 - 509 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Apr2020
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=142911052&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 142911052 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00264423 MND jtl: Mind (0026-4423) issn: 00264423 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2020 vid: 129 iid: 514 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 142911052 10.1093/mind/fzz025 ppf: 461 ppct: 48 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 392KB tig: atl: Learning from Conditionals. aug: au: Eva, Benjamin Hartmann, Stephan Rad, Soroush Rafiee affil: University of Konstanz Munich Centre for Mathematical Philosophy, LMU Munich University of Bayreuth su: Conditionals (Logic) Theory of knowledge Bayesian analysis Formalization (Linguistics) Comparative grammar sug: subj: Conditionals (Logic) Theory of knowledge Bayesian analysis Formalization (Linguistics) Comparative grammar ab: In this article, we address a major outstanding question of probabilistic Bayesian epistemology: how should a rational Bayesian agent update their beliefs upon learning an indicative conditional? A number of authors have recently contended that this question is fundamentally underdetermined by Bayesian norms, and hence that there is no single update procedure that rational agents are obliged to follow upon learning an indicative conditional. Here we resist this trend and argue that a core set of widely accepted Bayesian norms is sufficient to identify a normatively privileged updating procedure for this kind of learning. Along the way, we justify a privileged formalization of the notion of 'epistemic conservativity', offer a new analysis of the Judy Benjamin problem, and emphasize the distinction between interpreting the content of new evidence and updating one's beliefs on the basis of that content. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: © 2019 Mind Association. item: Mind (0026-4423) holder: Oxford University Press / USA dt: @attributes: year: 2020 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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