The Mental Affordance Hypothesis.

Our successful engagement with the world is plausibly underwritten by our sensitivity to affordances in our immediate environment. The considerable literature on affordances focuses almost exclusively on affordances for bodily actions such as gripping, walking or eating. I propose that we are also s...

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Publicado en:Mind (0026-4423) Vol. 129; no. 514; pp. 401 - 428
Autor principal: McClelland, Tom
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Oxford University Press / USA Apr2020
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: The Mental Affordance Hypothesis.
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        au: McClelland, Tom
        affil: The University of Warwick
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        Hypothesis
        Plausibility (Logic)
        Phenomenology
        Artificial intelligence
        Empirical research
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          Hypothesis
          Plausibility (Logic)
          Phenomenology
          Artificial intelligence
          Empirical research
      ab: Our successful engagement with the world is plausibly underwritten by our sensitivity to affordances in our immediate environment. The considerable literature on affordances focuses almost exclusively on affordances for bodily actions such as gripping, walking or eating. I propose that we are also sensitive to affordances for mental actions such as attending, imagining and counting. My case for this 'Mental Affordance Hypothesis' is motivated by a series of examples in which our sensitivity to mental affordances mirrors our sensitivity to bodily affordances. Specifically, subjects perceive opportunities to perform a mental action and their doing so leads, under the right conditions, to the automatic preparation of that action. I conclude by sketching a mental affordance research program that would reinforce my case for the Mental Affordance Hypothesis and establish its ramifications for a number of debates across philosophy and psychology.
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