Representing credal imprecision: from sets of measures to hierarchical Bayesian models.

The basic Bayesian model of credence states, where each individual's belief state is represented by a single probability measure, has been criticized as psychologically implausible, unable to represent the intuitive distinction between precise and imprecise probabilities, and normatively unjustifiab...

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Publicado en:	Philosophical Studies Vol. 177; no. 6; pp. 1463 - 1486
Autor principal:	Lassiter, Daniel
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Springer Nature Jun2020
Materias:	Science Developmental psychology & motivation Learning Forensic orations Bayesian analysis
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost