Can we perceive mental states?
In this paper, I defend Non-Inferentialism about mental states, the view that we can perceive some mental states in a direct, non-inferential way. First, I discuss how the question of mental state perception is to be understood in light of recent debates in the philosophy of perception, and reconstr...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 197; no. 5; pp. 2245 - 2270 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
May2020
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=142998964&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 142998964 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: May2020 vid: 197 iid: 5 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 142998964 10.1007/s11229-018-1807-7 ppf: 2245 ppct: 25 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 742KB tig: atl: Can we perceive mental states? aug: au: Neufeld, Eleonore affil: University of Southern California, School of Philosophy, 3709 Trousdale Parkway, 90089-045, Los Angeles, CA, USA su: Cognitive science Social perception Perception (Philosophy) Theory of mind Sensory perception sug: subj: Cognitive science Social perception Perception (Philosophy) Theory of mind Sensory perception keyword: Mental state perception Mindreading Non-Inferentialism Social cognition Theory of Mind ab: In this paper, I defend Non-Inferentialism about mental states, the view that we can perceive some mental states in a direct, non-inferential way. First, I discuss how the question of mental state perception is to be understood in light of recent debates in the philosophy of perception, and reconstruct Non-Inferentialism in a way that makes the question at hand—whether we can perceive mental states or not—scientifically tractable. Next, I motivate Non-Inferentialism by showing that under the assumption of the widely-accepted Principle of Cognitive Economy, any account that treats mental state perception as an inferential process commits itself to an unrealistically inefficient picture of our cognitive architecture. Drawing on research in cognitive science, I will then show that my Non-Inferentialist view receives direct support by the available empirical evidence. I conclude that there is no psychologically relevant sense in which perception of mental states differs from paradigmatic cases of perception, such as the perception of ordinary objects. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2020. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2020 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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