Great Expectations, Financialization, and Bank Bailouts in Democracies.
Accelerating financialization and rising societal wealth have meant that democratic governments increasingly provide bailouts following banking crises. Using a new long-run data set, we show that despite frequent and virulent crises before World War II, bank bailouts to protect wealth were then exce...
| Publicado en: | Comparative Political Studies Vol. 53; no. 8; pp. 1259 - 1298 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Sage Publications Inc.
Jul2020
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=143194153&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 143194153 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00104140 CPS jtl: Comparative Political Studies issn: 00104140 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jul2020 vid: 53 iid: 8 pid: 344 pub: Sage Publications Inc. artinfo: ui: 143194153 10.1177/0010414019897418 ppf: 1259 ppct: 39 formats: tig: atl: Great Expectations, Financialization, and Bank Bailouts in Democracies. aug: au: Chwieroth, Jeffrey M. Walter, Andrew affil: London School of Economics, UK The University of Melbourne, Victoria, Australia su: Financial bailouts Financialization World War II Sequential pattern mining sug: subj: Financial bailouts Financialization World War II Sequential pattern mining keyword: economic policy globalization political economy economic policy globalization political economy ab: Accelerating financialization and rising societal wealth have meant that democratic governments increasingly provide bailouts following banking crises. Using a new long-run data set, we show that despite frequent and virulent crises before World War II, bank bailouts to protect wealth were then exceptionally rare. In recent decades, by contrast, governments have increasingly opted for extensive bailouts—well before the major interventions of 2007–2009. We argue that this policy shift is the consequence of the "great expectations" of middle-class voters overlooked in existing accounts. Associated with the growing financialization of wealth, rising leverage, and accumulating ex ante financial stabilization commitments by governments, these expectations are suggestive of substantially altered policy preferences and political cleavages. Since the 1970s, when severe banking crises returned as an important threat to middle-class wealth, this "pressure from below" has led elected governments to provide increasingly costly bailouts with no historical precedent. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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