ISR is Still a Digital Ontology.
I will analyse Floridi's rejection of digital ontologies and his positive proposal for an informational structural realism (ISR). I intend to show that ISR is still fundamentally a digital ontology, albeit with some different metaphysical commitments to those that Floridi rejects. I will argue that...
| Published in: | Erkenntnis Vol. 85; no. 3; pp. 649 - 665 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Springer Nature
Jun2020
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=143396423&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 143396423 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01650106 5KZ jtl: Erkenntnis issn: 01650106 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jun2020 vid: 85 iid: 3 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 143396423 10.1007/s10670-018-0041-5 ppf: 649 ppct: 16 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 393KB tig: atl: ISR is Still a Digital Ontology. aug: au: Long, Bruce affil: University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia Department of Philosophy, University of Sydney, Camperdown, 2006, Sydney, NSW, Australia su: Ontologies (Information retrieval) Promissory notes Transcendentalism (Philosophy) Scientific computing Metaphysics Realism sug: subj: Ontologies (Information retrieval) Promissory notes Transcendentalism (Philosophy) Scientific computing Metaphysics Realism ab: I will analyse Floridi's rejection of digital ontologies and his positive proposal for an informational structural realism (ISR). I intend to show that ISR is still fundamentally a digital ontology, albeit with some different metaphysical commitments to those that Floridi rejects. I will argue that even though Floridi deploys the method of levels of abstraction adapted from computer science, and has established a Kantian transcendentalist conception of both information and structure, ISR still reduces to a discretised binary, and therefore digital, ontology. The digital ontologies that Floridi rejects are John Wheeler's "It from Bit" conception and computational (including pancomputational) metaphysics (although there are others). They're rejected predominantly on the basis that they rely upon a false dichotomy between digital discrete and continuous metaphysics (with which I agree). ISR involves a Kantian transcendentalist conception of de re relations that is intended to avoid this false dichotomy. However, I'll argue that the binary, discrete, digital component of digital ontology is retained in ISR, and therefore ISR is still a digital ontology since its conception of information reduces to binary discrete de re relations. As such, ISR comes down on one side of the rejected ontic dichotomy of digital metaphysics, and so an informational metaphysics that is not a digital ontology is still a promissory note in the philosophy of information. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2020. All Rights Reserved. item: Erkenntnis holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2020 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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