Alethic Reference.
I put forward precise and appealing notions of reference, self-reference, and well-foundedness for sentences of the language of first-order Peano arithmetic extended with a truth predicate. These notions are intended to play a central role in the study of the reference patterns that underlie express...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Philosophical Logic Vol. 49; no. 3; pp. 417 - 439 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jun2020
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | I put forward precise and appealing notions of reference, self-reference, and well-foundedness for sentences of the language of first-order Peano arithmetic extended with a truth predicate. These notions are intended to play a central role in the study of the reference patterns that underlie expressions leading to semantic paradox and, thus, in the construction of philosophically well-motivated semantic theories of truth. |
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