Recalcitrant Emotions: A Phenomenological View.
In this paper, I sketch an account of emotion that is based on a close analogy with a Husserlian account of perception. I also make use of the approach that I have limned, viz., to articulate a view of the kind of "conflict without contradiction" (CWC) which may obtain between a recalcitrant emotion...
| Publicado en: | Problems / Problemos Vol. 97; pp. 99 - 114 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Vilnius University
2020
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | In this paper, I sketch an account of emotion that is based on a close analogy with a Husserlian account of perception. I also make use of the approach that I have limned, viz., to articulate a view of the kind of "conflict without contradiction" (CWC) which may obtain between a recalcitrant emotion and a judgment. My main contention is that CWC can be accounted for by appeal to the rationality of perception and emotion, conceived as responsiveness to experiential evidence. The conflicts in question can be regarded as obtaining between different strands of evidence, and our perceptual and emotional experiences can be thus conflicted even among themselves, not only in the special case of a conflict with a judgment. Straipsnyje apibrėžiamas požiūris į emocijas, pagrįstas artima analogija su Husserlio požiūriu į suvokimą. Išreikštoji prieiga taip pat pasitelkiama ir tyrime, t. y. siekiant išreikšti tam tikrą „konfliktą be prieštaravimo", kuris gali susidaryti tarp nepaklusnios emocijos ir sprendimo. Esminis straipsnio teiginys - konfliktas be prieštaravimo gali būti paaiškintas apeliuojant į suvokimo ir emocijos racionalumą, suprantamą kaip atsakas į patirties duomenis. Aptariami konfliktai gali būti siejami su tuo, kad esama skirtingų patirties duomenų gijų, tad žmogaus suvokimo ir emociniai potyriai gali prieštarauti net tarpusavyje, ne tik tais atvejais, kai jie konfliktuoja su sprendimu. |
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