Information exchange in cartels.
Antitrust authorities view the exchange of information among firms regarding costs, prices, or sales as anticompetitive. Such exchanges allow competitors to closely monitor each other, thereby facilitating collusion. But the exchange of aggregate information, perhaps via a third party, is legal. The...
| Publicado en: | RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 51; no. 2; pp. 421 - 447 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
Jun2020
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=143852197&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 143852197 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 07416261 56RJ jtl: RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) issn: 07416261 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jun2020 vid: 51 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 143852197 10.1111/1756-2171.12320 ppf: 421 ppct: 26 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 310KB tig: atl: Information exchange in cartels. aug: au: Awaya, Yu Krishna, Vijay affil: University of Rochester Penn State University su: Information sharing Cartels Price cutting Collusion sug: subj: Information sharing Cartels Price cutting Collusion ab: Antitrust authorities view the exchange of information among firms regarding costs, prices, or sales as anticompetitive. Such exchanges allow competitors to closely monitor each other, thereby facilitating collusion. But the exchange of aggregate information, perhaps via a third party, is legal. The logic is that collusion is difficult if the identity of a price‐cutting firm cannot be ascertained. Here, we examine this logic using Stigler's model of secret price cuts. We first identify circumstances such that when no information exchange is possible, collusion is difficult. We then show that if firms' aggregate sales are made public, nearly perfect collusion is possible. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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