Information exchange in cartels.

Antitrust authorities view the exchange of information among firms regarding costs, prices, or sales as anticompetitive. Such exchanges allow competitors to closely monitor each other, thereby facilitating collusion. But the exchange of aggregate information, perhaps via a third party, is legal. The...

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Publicado en:RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 51; no. 2; pp. 421 - 447
Autores principales: Awaya, Yu, Krishna, Vijay
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Jun2020
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Information exchange in cartels.
      aug:
        au:
          Awaya, Yu
          Krishna, Vijay
        affil:
          University of Rochester
          Penn State University
      su:
        Information sharing
        Cartels
        Price cutting
        Collusion
      sug:
        subj:
          Information sharing
          Cartels
          Price cutting
          Collusion
      ab: Antitrust authorities view the exchange of information among firms regarding costs, prices, or sales as anticompetitive. Such exchanges allow competitors to closely monitor each other, thereby facilitating collusion. But the exchange of aggregate information, perhaps via a third party, is legal. The logic is that collusion is difficult if the identity of a price‐cutting firm cannot be ascertained. Here, we examine this logic using Stigler's model of secret price cuts. We first identify circumstances such that when no information exchange is possible, collusion is difficult. We then show that if firms' aggregate sales are made public, nearly perfect collusion is possible.
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    language: English
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