Aggregative games and oligopoly theory: short‐run and long‐run analysis.
We compile an IO toolkit for aggregative games with positive and normative comparative statics results for asymmetric oligopoly in the short and long run. We characterize the class of aggregative Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly games, and the subset for which the aggregate is a summary statistic for...
| Publicado en: | RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 51; no. 2; pp. 470 - 496 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jun2020
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=143852199&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 143852199 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 07416261 56RJ jtl: RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) issn: 07416261 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jun2020 vid: 51 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 143852199 10.1111/1756-2171.12322 ppf: 470 ppct: 26 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 533KB tig: atl: Aggregative games and oligopoly theory: short‐run and long‐run analysis. aug: au: Anderson, Simon P. Erkal, Nisvan Piccinin, Daniel affil: Department of Economics, University of Virginia Department of Economics, University of Melbourne Brick Court Chambers su: Game theory Oligopolies Market design & structure (Economics) Statics sug: subj: Game theory Oligopolies Market design & structure (Economics) Statics ab: We compile an IO toolkit for aggregative games with positive and normative comparative statics results for asymmetric oligopoly in the short and long run. We characterize the class of aggregative Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly games, and the subset for which the aggregate is a summary statistic for consumer welfare. We close the model with a monopolistically competitive fringe for long‐run analysis. Remarkably, we show strong neutrality properties in the long run across a wide range of market structures. The results elucidate aggregative games as a unifying principle in the literature on merger analysis, privatization, Stackelberg leadership, and cost shocks. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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