Network tasks and accountability: A configurational analysis of EU regulatory networks.
Intergovernmental networks have become a prominent cooperative mechanism to deal with trans‐boundary and interdependent problems. Yet, we still have limited knowledge of how these collaborative endeavours are governed, which is crucial to properly understanding how they function. This article empiri...
| Publicado en: | Public Administration Vol. 98; no. 2; pp. 480 - 498 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jun2020
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=143890868&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 143890868 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00333298 PAD jtl: Public Administration issn: 00333298 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jun2020 vid: 98 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 143890868 10.1111/padm.12631 ppf: 480 ppct: 18 formats: tig: atl: Network tasks and accountability: A configurational analysis of EU regulatory networks. aug: au: Saz‐Carranza, Angel Albareda, Adrià Federo, Ryan affil: ESADE—Ramon Llul University, Barcelona, Spain Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs, University of Leiden, Leiden, The Netherlands su: European Union Tasks Comparative studies sug: subj: European Union Tasks Comparative studies ab: Intergovernmental networks have become a prominent cooperative mechanism to deal with trans‐boundary and interdependent problems. Yet, we still have limited knowledge of how these collaborative endeavours are governed, which is crucial to properly understanding how they function. This article empirically examines the structural governance configurations of rule‐enforcing networks in the European Union. The article relies on data from 37 networks with rule‐enforcing tasks and conducts a qualitative comparative analysis. We find three basic governance structure configurations used by rule‐enforcing networks: first, a configuration with legal accountability, which is characterized by having a board of appeals; second, one with administrative accountability that, in addition to a board of appeals, has powerful executive boards and professional experts in the network plenary; and a third one with democratic accountability that incorporates legislative representatives in the network plenary. We argue that these results show how network tasks are related to accountability and governance. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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