A Cause for Alarm? The Long‐term Performance of Shareholder Class Action Defendants.

Using two decades of shareholder class action filings, we provide evidence of significant and consistent long‐run price underperformance in defendant firms. By partitioning our sample according to the merits of an action, we show that firms less likely to have been involved in earnings manipulation,...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Abacus Vol. 56; no. 2; pp. 213 - 230
Autores principales: Aspris, Angelo, McAlpin, Luke
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Jun2020
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=144313531&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: hlh
    uiTerm: 144313531
    longDbName: Humanities International Complete
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        00013072
        AUB
      jtl: Abacus
      issn: 00013072
      maglogo: Y
    pubinfo:
      dt: Jun2020
      vid: 56
      iid: 2
      pid: 480
      pub: Wiley-Blackwell
    artinfo:
      ui:
        144313531
        10.1111/abac.12189
      ppf: 213
      ppct: 17
      formats:
        fmt:
          – @attributes:
              type: T
          – @attributes:
              type: C
          – @attributes:
              type: P
              size: 233KB
      tig:
        atl: A Cause for Alarm? The Long‐term Performance of Shareholder Class Action Defendants.
      aug:
        au:
          Aspris, Angelo
          McAlpin, Luke
        affil:
          University of Sydney Business School,, Australia
          University of New South Wales,, Australia
      su:
        Class actions
        Stockholders
        Defendants
        Alarms
        Earnings management
      sug:
        subj:
          Class actions
          Stockholders
          Defendants
          Alarms
          Earnings management
      keyword:
        Litigation
        Shareholder class actions
      ab: Using two decades of shareholder class action filings, we provide evidence of significant and consistent long‐run price underperformance in defendant firms. By partitioning our sample according to the merits of an action, we show that firms less likely to have been involved in earnings manipulation, but who may have benefited from corrective management improvements and better signalling, go on to experience significant price reversals within a year of the filing date. Firms identified as high probability manipulators underperform over the long‐term. Our results have important implications for ongoing policy discussions on the merits of shareholder class actions.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: Y
      custom: Copyright of Abacus is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.
      item: Abacus
      holder: Wiley-Blackwell
      dt:
        @attributes:
          year: 2020
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N