False Re-Representations in Self-Knowledge.
Self-knowledge (SK) is a natural ability of the human cognitive system and is defined as a complex re-representation of knowledge subject has about her own internal states. It is composed of two basic representations: the representation of I and the representation of the experienced state. SK has a...
| Publicado en: | Logic & Logical Philosophy Vol. 29; no. 3; pp. 463 - 482 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Logic & Logical Philosophy
2020
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=144434216&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 144434216 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 14253305 DS9 jtl: Logic & Logical Philosophy issn: 14253305 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: 2020 vid: 29 iid: 3 pid: 42904 pub: Logic & Logical Philosophy artinfo: ui: 144434216 10.12775/LLP.2020.007 ppf: 463 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 2.4MB tig: atl: False Re-Representations in Self-Knowledge. aug: au: Pacholik-Żuromska, Anita affil: Department of Cognitive Science Institute of Information and Communication Research Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń su: Cognitive ability Propositional attitudes First-order logic sug: subj: Cognitive ability Propositional attitudes First-order logic keyword: applied logic misidentification propositional attitudes representations self-knowledge self-model ab: Self-knowledge (SK) is a natural ability of the human cognitive system and is defined as a complex re-representation of knowledge subject has about her own internal states. It is composed of two basic representations: the representation of I and the representation of the experienced state. SK has a propositional (i.e. language-like) form and can be expressed in the form of self-reports like "I believe that I believe that p". It has then the form of a second-order belief which, as a re-representation, generates the following problem concerning false representations: if the first-order representations of the I or of experienced states can be false like in cases of self-illusions or disorders like somatoparaphrenia, then how can error in self-cognition inherited by the re-representation (i.e. by SK) be avoided? I claim that the re-representational model of SK is a useful but artificial tool for the description of the components of SK; however, it is misleading to think of it as capturing the truth about SK. I propose here a representational model of SK which reduces those beliefs constituting SK to first-order beliefs which are sufficient as constituents of SK. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Logic & Logical Philosophy is the property of Logic & Logical Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Logic & Logical Philosophy holder: Logic & Logical Philosophy dt: @attributes: year: 2020 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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