Same Game, Different Names: Cream-Skimming in the Post-ACA Individual Health Insurance Market.

One of the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) signature reforms was creating centralized Health Insurance Marketplaces to offer comprehensive coverage in the form of comprehensive insurance complying with the ACA's coverage standards. Yet, even after the ACA's implementation, millions of people were covere...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Inquiry (00469580) Vol. 57; pp. 1 - 10
Main Authors: Sacks, Daniel W., Drake, Coleman, Abraham, Jean M., Simon, Kosali
Format: Article
Published: Sage Publications Inc. 7/9/2020
Subjects:
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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      dt: 7/9/2020
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        atl: Same Game, Different Names: Cream-Skimming in the Post-ACA Individual Health Insurance Market.
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        au:
          Sacks, Daniel W.
          Drake, Coleman
          Abraham, Jean M.
          Simon, Kosali
        affil:
          Indiana University Bloomington, USA
          University of Pittsburgh, PA, USA
          University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, USA
      su:
        Employment
        Health services administration
        Insurance
        Insurance companies
        Medicaid
        Medical care costs
        Health policy
        Multivariate analysis
        Research funding
        Taxation
        Regulatory approval
        Government regulation
        Multiple regression analysis
        Patient Protection & Affordable Care Act
        Health insurance exchanges
      sug:
        subj:
          Employment
          Health services administration
          Insurance
          Insurance companies
          Medicaid
          Medical care costs
          Health policy
          Multivariate analysis
          Research funding
          Taxation
          Regulatory approval
          Government regulation
          Multiple regression analysis
          Patient Protection & Affordable Care Act
          Health insurance exchanges
      keyword:
        cream-skimming
        health insurance
        health insurance marketplaces
        individual health insurance market
        Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
        state insurance policy
      ab: One of the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) signature reforms was creating centralized Health Insurance Marketplaces to offer comprehensive coverage in the form of comprehensive insurance complying with the ACA's coverage standards. Yet, even after the ACA's implementation, millions of people were covered through noncompliant plans, primarily in the form of continued enrollment in "grandmothered" and "grandfathered" plans that predated ACA's full implementation and were allowed under federal and state regulations. Newly proposed and enacted federal legislation may grow the noncompliant segment in future years, and the employment losses of 2020 may grow reliance on individual market coverage further. These factors make it important to understand how the noncompliant segment affects the compliant segment, including the Marketplaces. We show, first, that the noncompliant segment of the individual insurance market substantially outperformed the compliant segment, charging lower premiums but with vastly lower costs, suggesting that insurers have a strong incentive to enter the noncompliant segment. We show, next, that state's decisions to allow grandmothered plans is associated with stronger financial performance of the noncompliant market, but weaker performance of the compliant segment, as noncompliant plans attract lower-cost enrollees. This finding indicates important linkages between the noncompliant and compliant segments and highlights the role state policy can play in the individual insurance market. Taken together, our results point to substantial cream-skimming, with noncompliant plans enrolling the healthiest enrollees, resulting in higher average claims cost in the compliant segment.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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          year: 2020
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