Epistemically engineered environments.
In other work I have defended the claim that, when we rely on other speakers by accepting what they tell us, our reliance on them differs in epistemically relevant ways from our reliance on instruments, when we rely on them by accepting what they "tell" us. However, where I have explored the former...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 197; no. 7; pp. 2783 - 2803 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jul2020
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=144546337&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 144546337 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2020 vid: 197 iid: 7 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 144546337 10.1007/s11229-017-1413-0 ppf: 2783 ppct: 20 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 395KB tig: atl: Epistemically engineered environments. aug: au: Goldberg, Sanford C. affil: Department of Philosophy, Northwestern University, 60208, Evanston, IL, USA su: Social epistemology sug: subj: Social epistemology keyword: Epistemic dependence Epistemic expectations Social practices ab: In other work I have defended the claim that, when we rely on other speakers by accepting what they tell us, our reliance on them differs in epistemically relevant ways from our reliance on instruments, when we rely on them by accepting what they "tell" us. However, where I have explored the former sort of reliance at great length (Goldberg 2010), I have not done so with the latter. In this paper my aim is to do so. My key notions will be those of our social practices, the normative expectations that are sanctioned by those practices, and the epistemically engineered environments constituted by some of these practices. With these notions in mind, I will argue that one's reliance on instruments, while relevantly different (epistemically speaking) from one's reliance on other speakers, can nevertheless manifest a kind of epistemic dependence which epistemological theory can and should acknowledge. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2020. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2020 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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