Formalizing Kant's Rules: A Logic of Conditional Imperatives and Permissives.
This paper formalizes part of the cognitive architecture that Kant develops in the Critique of Pure Reason. The central Kantian notion that we formalize is the rule. As we interpret Kant, a rule is not a declarative conditional stating what would be true if such and such conditions hold. Rather, a K...
| Published in: | Journal of Philosophical Logic Vol. 49; no. 4; pp. 613 - 681 |
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| Main Authors: | , , |
| Format: | Article |
| Published: |
Springer Nature
Aug2020
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=144580633&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 144580633 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00223611 JPH jtl: Journal of Philosophical Logic issn: 00223611 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Aug2020 vid: 49 iid: 4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 144580633 10.1007/s10992-019-09531-x ppf: 613 ppct: 68 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 4.2MB tig: atl: Formalizing Kant's Rules: A Logic of Conditional Imperatives and Permissives. aug: au: Evans, R. Sergot, M. Stephenson, A. affil: Imperial College London, London, UK University of Southampton, Southampton, UK su: Conditionals (Logic) First-order logic Logic design Natural languages Logic sug: subj: Conditionals (Logic) First-order logic Logic design Natural languages Logic keyword: Conditional imperatives Input/output logics Kant Normativity ab: This paper formalizes part of the cognitive architecture that Kant develops in the Critique of Pure Reason. The central Kantian notion that we formalize is the rule. As we interpret Kant, a rule is not a declarative conditional stating what would be true if such and such conditions hold. Rather, a Kantian rule is a general procedure, represented by a conditional imperative or permissive, indicating which acts must or may be performed, given certain acts that are already being performed. These acts are not propositions; they do not have truth-values. Our formalization is related to the input/ output logics, a family of logics designed to capture relations between elements that need not have truth-values. In this paper, we introduce KL as a formalization of Kant's conception of rules as conditional imperatives and permissives. We explain how it differs from standard input/output logics, geometric logic, and first-order logic, as well as how it translates natural language sentences not well captured by first-order logic. Finally, we show how the various distinctions in Kant's much-maligned Table of Judgements emerge as the most natural way of dividing up the various types and sub-types of rule in KL. Our analysis sheds new light on the way in which normative notions play a fundamental role in the conception of logic at the heart of Kant's theoretical philosophy. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Journal of Philosophical Logic is a copyright of Springer, 2020. All Rights Reserved. item: Journal of Philosophical Logic holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2020 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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