The Attitudinal Opacity of Emotional Experience.

According to some philosophers, when introspectively attending to experience, we seem to see right through it to the (apparent) objects outside, including their properties. This is called the transparency of experience. This paper examines whether, and in what sense, emotions are transparent. It arg...

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Publicado en:Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 70; no. 280; pp. 524 - 547
Autor principal: Mitchell, Jonathan
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Oxford University Press / USA Jul2020
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: The Attitudinal Opacity of Emotional Experience.
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        au: Mitchell, Jonathan
        affil: University of Manchester , UK
      su:
        Philosophy of emotions
        Experience
        Attitude (Psychology)
        Philosophy
        Philosophers
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          Philosophy of emotions
          Experience
          Attitude (Psychology)
          Philosophy
          Philosophers
      keyword:
        attitude
        Emotion
        experience
        opacity
        transparency
        valence
      ab: According to some philosophers, when introspectively attending to experience, we seem to see right through it to the (apparent) objects outside, including their properties. This is called the transparency of experience. This paper examines whether, and in what sense, emotions are transparent. It argues that emotional experiences are opaque in a distinctive way: introspective attention to them does not principally reveal non-intentional somatic qualia but rather felt valenced intentional attitudes. As such, emotional experience is attitudinally opaque.
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    language: English
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