We talk to people, not contexts.
According to a popular family of theories, assertions and other communicative acts should be understood as attempts to change the context of a conversation. Contexts, on this view, are publicly shared bodies of information that evolve over the course of a conversation and that play a range of semant...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 177; no. 9; pp. 2713 - 2734 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Sep2020
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=144642702&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 144642702 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Sep2020 vid: 177 iid: 9 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 144642702 10.1007/s11098-019-01335-8 ppf: 2713 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 303KB tig: atl: We talk to people, not contexts. aug: au: Harris, Daniel W. affil: Hunter College, CUNY, 695 Park Ave., 10065, New York, NY, USA su: Semantics Anaphora (Linguistics) Speech acts (Linguistics) Pragmatics Communication sug: subj: Semantics Anaphora (Linguistics) Speech acts (Linguistics) Pragmatics Communication keyword: Anaphora Assertion Context Grice Speech acts Stalnaker ab: According to a popular family of theories, assertions and other communicative acts should be understood as attempts to change the context of a conversation. Contexts, on this view, are publicly shared bodies of information that evolve over the course of a conversation and that play a range of semantic and pragmatic roles. I argue that this view is mistaken: performing a communicative act requires aiming to change the mind of one's addressee, but not necessarily the context. Although changing the context may sometimes be among a speaker's aims, this should be seen as an extra-communicative aim, rather than one that is necessary for the performance of a communicative act. Along the way, I also argue that contexts needn't play a role in linking anaphora to their antecedents. On the view that I defend, theories that take publicly shared contexts to play an essential role in the nature of communicative acts or anaphoric dependence conflate an artifact introduced by idealized models of conversation with a feature of the phenomenon being modeled. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2020. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2020 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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